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A Race Approach to International Law
(RAIL): Is There a Need for Yet Another
Critique of International Law?
Ediberto Romdn *
I seek not what his soul desires.
He dreads not what my spirit fears.
Our Heavens have shown us separate fires.
Our dooms have dealt us differing years.
Our daysprings and our timeless dead
Ordained for us and still control
Lives sundered at the fountain-head,
And distant, now, as Pole from Pole.
Yet, dwelling thus, these worlds apart,
When we encounter each is free
To bare that larger, liberal heart
Our kin and neighbors seldom see.
- Rudyard Kipling
INTRODUCTION
The past few decades have produced formidable scholarly efforts
that have examined,' questioned,2 criticized3 and even shielded 4 the
* Associate Professor of Law, St. Thomas University; J.D., University of Wisconsin; B.A.
Lehman College. This work is dedicated in loving memory to Carmen Hernandez. Special
thanks to Professors Peter Margulies, Jean Thomas, and Siegfried Wiessner for their com-
ments on earlier drafts and Ms. Raquel A. Regalado for her invaluable research and editorial
assistance. This is a footnoted version of my comments at the Fourth Annual LatCrit Con-
ference, Lake Tahoe, Nevada, April, 1999.
See, e.g., SHABTAI ROSENNE, PRACTICE AND METHODS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1-121
(1984) (surveying methodology, documentation, and bibliography of public international
law); Deborah Z. Cass, Navigating The Newstream: Recent Critical Scholarship in International
Law, 65 NORDIC J. INT'L L. 341, 341-44 (1996) (defining traditional public international
law); David Kennedy, A New Stream of International Law Scholarship, 7 Wis. INT'L L.J. 1, 1-11
(1988) (describing discipline and method of international law).
' See, e.g., SamuelJ. Astorino, The Impact of Sociological Jurisprudence on International Law
in the Inter-War Period. The American Experience, 34 DuQ. L. REv. 277, 277 (1996) (stating that
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theoretical and philosophical foundations of public international
law5 and liberal theory. 6 All of the international frameworks or
paradigms attempt to explain the traits of international law and to
address contemporary international issues Pragmatically speak-
ing, the notion of methods or frameworks to international law as
utilized here is the application of various approaches in an attempt
to explain and address the actual problems the international
community faces.8
This work reviews an important shortcoming of the dominant
public international paradigm and the recent methodical re-
sponses to that edifice. Specifically, this article argues that issues of
race have not been significantly addressed in international law dis-
course. In particular, this Article notes that in the theoretical dis-
course some writers have discussed race, but the thrust of the dis-
course marginalizes the importance of race. In the practice of in-
realistic understanding of international law does not yet exist); R. St. J. MacDonald & Doug-
las M. Johnston, International Legal Theory: New Frontiers of the Discipline, in THE STRUCTURE
AND PROCESS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 1, 3 (R. St. J. MacDonald & Douglas M. Johnston eds.,
1983) (lamenting loss of control over discipline of international law due to specialization
and fragmentation); Hans J. Morgenthau, Positivism, Functionalism, and International Law, 34
AM.J. INT'L L. 260, 273 (1940) (asserting positivist international law's weakness in ignoring
reality).
3 See, e.g., ANTHONY CARTY, THE DECAY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW?: A REAPPRAISAL OF
THE LIMITS OF LEGAL IMAGINATION IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 1-11 (1986) (positing that
international law has not been and cannot be purely positivist); MARTrI KOSKENNIEMI, FROM
APOLOGY TO UTOPIA: THE STRUCTURE OF INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ARGUMENT 1 (1989) (as-
serting that international law's traditional normative approach is faulty and should reflect
social determinants); Hilary Charlesworth et al., Feminist Approaches to International Law, 85
Am. J. INT'L L. 613, 621-43 (1991) (arguing that traditional international law ignores
women's voices).
4 See, e.g., THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS
483-84 (1995) (proposing modifying state-centered system of international law instead of
radical change); HANS KELSEN, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 438 (Robert W. Tucker
ed., 2d ed. 1966) (arguing that international law is valid even when understood as part of
national law).
5 See David Kennedy & Chris Tennant, New Approaches to International Law: A Bibliogra-
phy, 35 HARV. INT'L L.J. 417, 418 (1994) (stating that in past two decades volume of scholarly
work that is rethinking international law has increased).
' This debate is commonly referred to as the discourse on the methods or methodol-
ogy of international law. See Steven R. Ramer & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Appraising the Meth-
ods of International Law: A Prospectus for Readers, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 291, 291 (1999) (stating
that debate regarding public international law turns on methodology); see also ROSENNE,
supra note 1, at 1 (asserting that questions regarding nature and purpose of international
law are hotly debated).
7 See Ratner & Slaughter, supra note 6, at 292 (noting that theories of international law
explain nature of international law but may not always be relevant to contemporary issues).
' See id. (asserting that international law theory must be analyzed in light of its rele-
vance to contemporary issues).
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ternational law, people of color are affected but rarely recognized
in policy debates. Additionally, this work attempts to explain how a
discourse that positions race at the center of the discourse in-
creases the prospect of a coherent view of international law. At its
core, this work recognizes that both the traditional approach and
its responses contain some virtue, but are woefully lacking in at
least one important respect. The existing approaches to interna-
tional law fail to adequately explore the consequential nature that
race has played in the development of international law. By review-
ing the theoretical foundations of the approaches and by providing
vivid examples of the racialized nature of movements in interna-
tional law, this article will demonstrate how race has been a real
but unspoken determinant of international policy. This Article, in
addition to acknowledging the beginnings of a new race-based ap-
proach to international law, formally proposes a race-focused in-
ternational discourse in order to ensure that an often determina-
tive variable to international action is not at best relegated to
merely one of a host of potential relevant, factors to international
policy making. Following a handful of scholars who have begun to
address the impact of race on certain international issues, this pa-
per calls for the recognition of a race-focused discourse that will
extend and expand the scope and depth of international dialogue,
as well as ensure an inclusion of diverse voices in the already robust
debate that is the methods discourse on international law. Finally,
a race approach to international law will attempt to debunk the
purported objectivity of the liberal paradigm and question the real-
ity of the humanitarian rhetoric that is at the root of international
law.
I. THE TRADITIONAL DISCOURSE
Traditional international law contains two doctrines that seek to
provide the rationale for the rules of international law that validate
the actions of nation-states.9 Proponents of these doctrines at-
tempted "to formulate a philosophical justification for the binding
force" that international law has on nation-states.'0 The first is the
9 See J.L. BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE INTERNATIONAL
LAW OF PEACE 49 (Humphrey Waldock ed., 6th ed. 1963) (stating that two rival doctrines
attempt to explain why states must observe international law).
" Kennedy, supra note 1, at 17 (stating that traditional scholars struggled tojustify why
sovereigns should adhere to international law).
20001 1521
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fundamental rights doctrine, which is a corollary of the doctrine of
the "states of nature," also known as natural law, is one such
justification."
"Under the 'fundamental rights' doctrine, principles of interna-
tional law can be deduced from the essential nature of the State." 2
Hence, much like individuals, "every State, by virtue of [being a
state,] is endowed with certain fundamental, inherent, or natural
rights." 3  However, recent responses to the traditional approach
have criticized this theory because it is based on a naive faith in a
moral order or authority.1
4
The second traditional doctrine, positivism, asserts that interna-
tional law is simply an aggregation of rules consented to by nation-
states. 5 Under this theory, international law is reduced to the ac-
quiescence of nation-states.' Thus for positivists, international law
consists of the rules to which nation-states have agreed through
treaties and custom. 7 Consequently, the nation-state or sovereign
is the protagonist in the international drama, and in the absence of
the nation-state's consent to a particular international law it is free
to undertake whatever act it pleases.8  Not surprisingly, the two
underlying theoretical foundations of the traditional approach to
international law conflict. While the natural law framework advo-
cates an ordained basis for legitimacy, the positivist basis posits a
consensual basis for legitimacy.
Despite the tension between them, the traditional doctrines to
international law have produced what has been described as an
uneasy positivist truce. '9 This positivist formulation has been re-
ferred to by its chief twentieth century proponent, Hans Kelsen, as
See id. at 17-18.
" Jianming Shen, The Basis of International Law: Why Nations Observe, 17 DICK.J. INT'L L.
270,303 (1999).
" Id.
See, e.g., Kennedy, supra note 1, at 16 (stating that ancient scholars' faith in moral
order is dated because scholars today find distinction between legal and moral norms).
, See Ratner & Slaughter, supra note 6, at 293 (stating that international law comprises
set of rules nations agree to through treaties, custom, or otherwise).
"6 See id. (stating that positivists assume nations are free to act unless nations choose to
abide by international law).
17 See id.
See id. (stating that positivists view nation-states as only subjects of international law).
'9 See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 3 (stating that modern international lawyers in United
States harmonized naturalism and positivism).
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the pure theory of law.20 Under the pure theory, the authority of
law is not questioned but explained. As was recently observed,
positivism
is not necessarily taking the so-called bad man's view of the law,
namely, that people would only obey the law because they fear...
punishment .... For most of the time, most obey the law because
they regard the law to rest upon moral order and to derive its le-
gitimization from it.
2
'
As this quote verifies, the so-called positivist truce is often ex-
plained by terminology that resembles the doctrine of natural
rights.
And yet, the truce has not eradicated the traditional doctrines of
which it is comprised. One vindicator of the traditional paradigm,
Thomas Franck, has argued that the very consent-based structure
of the international formulation promotes adherence among na-
tion-states, and thereby legitimacy, because it accommodates a
deeply felt popular belief that for a system of rules to be fair, it
must be firmly rooted in a framework of agreed upon formal re-
quirements. Such observations reflect the view that the primary
subjects of international law are the nation-states.
The nation-state is thus "the authoritative political institution"
which as a result has dominion or sovereignty over its citizens, 2' and
is equal to all other nation-states. This position is evidenced by
the international court of justices holding that international law
does not address individuals directly.25 Though individuals can be
beneficiaries of international legal norms, the traditional paradigm
continues to assume that norms that affect individuals will be neu-
See HYMEN EZRA COHEN, RECENT THEORIES OF SOVEREIGNTY 57-79 (1937) (describing
Kelsen's theory of international law as pure jurisprudence); Hans Kelsen, The Pure Theory of
Law and Analytical Jurisprudence, 55 HARV. L. REV. 44, 44 (1941) (explaining how pure theory
is positivist).
2' KEOKOK LEE, THE POSITIVIST SCIENCE OF LAW 187 (1989).
" See FRANCK, supra note 4, at 25-26 (stating that legitimacy of rules is based on belief
that rule exists and operates because process that created rule is correct).
" COLLAPSED STATES: THE DISINTEGRATION AND RESTORATION OF LEGITIMATE
AUTHORITY 1 (I. William Zartman ed., 1993).
21 See CRAWFORD YOUNG, THE AFRICAN COLONIAL STATE IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
27-30 (1994) (outlining territorial and power limitations inherent in concept of "state")
See Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries (U.K.V. Nor.), 1951 ICJ Rep. 166; Fisheries Jurisdic-
tion (U.K.V. Ice.), Merits, 1974 ICJ Rep.
20001 1523
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trally applied." This belief appears to stem from the premise that
the nation-state will act in the best interest of its constituency.
The classic positivist contends that the "[1]aw is regarded as a
unified system of rules that ... emanate from the will of the [na-
tion-state] .,,27 "This system of rules is an 'objective"' and legitimate
reality, unlike the subjective questions of what the rules should be,
that emanates from the nation-state's will,28 so that in a sense, posi-
tivism is the acceptance of the systemization of international order.
II. THE RESPONSE TO THE TRADITIONAL APPROACH
The positivist-naturalist conventional doctrines, which are at the
bedrock of the dominant liberal paradigm, have produced ample
criticism. The critiques, which are rooted in a variety of theoretical
methodologies, challenge the conventional doctrines. Particularly
this is achieved by contesting the efficacy of the positivist formula-
tion.
Arguably, the most prominent current critique stems from a
group of theorists who have been labeled "new stream" scholars.
This group, influenced by critical legal studies, seeks to move be-
yond the doctrine and relevance of law by exposing the contradic-
tions of traditional international discourse. In so doing they seek
' See Charlesworth et al., supra note 3, at 625 (stating that international jurisprudence
assumes that international norms directed at individuals are universally applicable).
" See Bruno Simma & Andreas L. Paulus, The Responsibility of Individuals for Human
Rights Abuses in Internal Conflicts: A Positivist View, 93 Am.J. INT'L L. 302, 304 (1999) (describ-
ing classic positivism as associating law with emanation of state will).
' See id. (stating that classic positivism views legal rules as objective and divorced from
subjective concerns).
See Ratner & Slaughter, supra note 6, at 294 (describing New Stream scholars as influ-
enced by critical legal studies and seeking to focus on contradictions of international law
discourse). Anthony Carty described the range of critical legal studies' influence when he
noted:
Critical international legal studies.., opposes itself to positivist international law,
as representative of an actual consensus among States. [It asks] whether a positive
system of universal internal law actually exists, or whether particular States and
their representative legal scholars merely appeal to such positivist discourse so as
to impose a particularist language upon others as if it were a universally accepted legal
discourse. So post-modernism is concerned with unearthing difference, heteroge-
neity and conflict as reality in place of fictional representations of universality and
consensus.
Anthony Carty, Critical International Law: Recent Trends in the Theory of International Law, 2
EUR.J. INT'L L. 66, 66 (1992).
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to refine an understanding of the importance of culture and policy
in the development of international law."
Another critique of the traditional discourse is from the camp of
international law and relations. This group, known as the IR/IL
camp, provides an interdisciplinary approach that seeks to incor-
porate political science and international relations insight into in-
ternational law.3' Meanwhile, another group, the New Haven or
policy-oriented jurisprudence has taken an approach that eschews
positivism's structuralism and formalistic adherence to rules.32 This
method views law as a process towards making decisions. It shares
with legal realism a focus on the empirical: on delineating the
problem in the context of relevant conditioning factors. 34 After
considering a problem in that light, this group seeks to resolve the
problem in accordance with "a world public order of human dig-
nity.-4
5
Finally, feminist scholars have introduced an approach, known as
feminist international jurisprudence, 6 which seeks to emphasize
the significance of gender relations in the creation of international
law. This group also questions international law's claim to objectiv-
ity and impartiality and challenges the traditional separation of
public from private in the international law discourse because it
37
serves as a tool for excluding gender issues.
" See Ratner & Slaughter, supra note 6, at 294 (stating critical legal studies scholars
emphasize culture in development of international law); Gerry J. Simpson, Is International
Law Fair?, 17 MICH.J. INT'L L. 615, 615 (1996) (reviewing THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN
INTERNATIONAL LAw (1995)) (stating that New Stream scholars wish to shift focus to culture
and policy).
" See Ratner & Slaughter, supra note 6, at 294 (describing IR/IL school as seeking to
incorporate international relations theory). This piece is a survey of several critiques and is
not to be interpreted as an extensive study of all the methodological approaches to interna-
tional law. See generally Symposium, Method in International Law, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 291
(1999).
" See Ratner & Slaughter, supra note 6, at 293-94 (describing New Haven School as
rejecting positivism's objectivity and instead emphasizing policy).
See id. at 294.
See Siegfried Wiessner & Andrew R. Willard, Policy-Oriented Jurisprudence and Human
Rights Abuses in Internal Conflict: Toward a World Public Order of Human Dignity, 93 AM.J. INT'L
L. 316, 317-18 (1999) (stating that policy-oriented theory brings attention to relevance of
context).
See id. at 334 (stating that policy-oriented theory seeks ultimately to reflect global
interest in human dignity).
m See Ratner & Slaughter, supra note 6, at 294 (stating feminist scholars seek to examine
international law to reflect how it reflects men's domination).
" See Hilary Charlesworth, Feminist Methods in International Law, 93 AM.J. INT'L L. 379,
392 (1999) (concluding that feminist approach to international law seeks to question objec-
2000] 1525
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While exerting different methods, all these critics of the tradi-
tional paradigm seem to share a common belief that in practice the
actions of nation-states rarely comport with the humanitarian
rhetoric of the traditional edifice. 8 Put another way, the responses
examine the failure of international law to provide a viable frame-
work for deterring and responding to human rights violations.39
The new stream critiques, while considered harsh, are relevant in
that they argue that the focus of the traditional paradigm is based
on contradictory justifications that result in an inherent indeter-
minacy.40 For example, they reject the positivist's blanket accep-
tance that what is fundamental is determined by mere sovereign
agreement that such things are fundamental. 4' These critiques
challenge the dominant paradigm by questioning the adherence to
the normativity of the nation-state. 42 Accordingly, they note that
the acceptance of the virtue of the sovereign or nation-state and its
actions ignores the contemporary upheavals and transformations
that will not stay swept under some static rug.45
Recently, a pointed critique of the positivist paradigm by the pol-
icy-oriented camp observed that positivism's "focus on 'existing'
rules, emanating solely from entities deemed to be equally 'sover-
eign' does not properly reflect the reality of how law is made, ap-
plied and changed."" They noted that positivism "remains fixated
on the past, trying to reap from words laid down, irrespective of the
context in which they were written, the solution to a problem that
tivity because this ignores gender); Charlesworth et al., supra note 3, at 644 (concluding that
relegating gender issues to private discourse is inappropriate).
'8 Cf Ratner & Slaughter, supra note 6, at 295 (noting that symposium question regard-
ing accountability for human rights was accepted by all authors espousing differing method-
ologies).
Cf Kennedy & Tennant, supra note 5, at 419-20 (noting that new approach scholars
are critical of international law's traditional response to what such scholars find important).
o See Ana Sljivic, Why Do They Think It's Yours?: An Exposition of the Jurisprudence Underly-
ing the Debate Between Cultural Nationalism and Cultural Internationalism, 31 GEO. WASH.J. INT'L
L. & ECON. 393, 431-33 (1997-98) (stating that new stream scholars criticize traditional dis-
course because conflicting theories are continually advanced, thus leading to indetermi-
nacy).
" See CARTY, supra note 3, at 110 (questioning whether mere acceptance of rule by
states proves its validity internationally); KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 3, at 20-21 (noting that
determining validity of international law is uncertain because standard to be used is uncer-
tain).
42 Cf Paul H. Brietzke, Self-determination, or Jurisprudential Confusion: Exacerbating Political
Conflict, 14 Wis. INT'L LJ. 69, 92-95 (1995) (noting that increased relevance of human rights
concerns, interdependence, and nongovernmental organizations erode sovereignty).
43 See id. at 102.
" Wiessner & Willard, supra note 34, at 320.
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arises today or tomorrow in very different circumstances."' 5 Thus,
the thrust of the critiques of the traditional liberal international
law paradigm has been whether the paradigm can adequately ad-
dress and respond to the needs of those who are affected by actions
of nation-states.
Given this deficiency, some of the critics, such as the policy-
oriented approach and the international relations approach, have
expounded alternative approaches to reach solutions for interna-
tional law.46 While others, such as the feminist critique, rather than
discerning ultimate truths or explanations to international issues,
have tried to shift the positioning of the discourse so as to insure
that certain issues are not marginalized.47 This latter group, build-
ing on deconstructionist philosophies, has introduced different
perspectives or modes of emphasis that were omitted from the tra-
ditional discourse.8 Some of these critics have concluded that in-
ternational regimes that seem too weak to pursue an intended po-
litical program and, unable to withstand scrutiny, are also too
technocratic to assist those in need.49
Despite the differences, a common trend exists among all critics.
They all assert that the philosophical and theoretical structures
justifying nation-states' compliance with the rules of international
law have failed to cause nation-states to comport with these rules.
This has produced incoherence in the application of international
law, which in turn marks the utter failure of international law to
achieve the reforms that were the impetus for its creation.5 0 These
critiques of the dominant formulation often also assert that the
liberal foundations of the internationalist edifice fail to address the
' Id.
' See Ratner & Slaughter, supra note 6, at 293 (noting that legal positivism, interna-
tional legal process, policy-oriented, critical legal studies, international law and relations,
feminism, and law and economics theories represent major theories of international law
today).
47 See KOSKENNIEMI, supra note 3, at 476-501 (using critical legal studies approach to
critique the traditional discourse); Charlesworth et al., supra note 3, at 621-25 (challenging
male dominated formulation of international law).
' See supra note 3 and accompanying text (using deconstructionist philosophy to criti-
cize traditional discourse).
49 See, e.g., David Kennedy, The International Style in Postwar Law and Policy, 1994 UTAH L.
REV. 7, 103 (noting that "technocratic excesses and political weakness" renders lesser devel-
oped countries unable to help needy).
50 See CARTY, supra note 3, at 1 (stating that no legal system comprehensively defines
duties of states); Kennedy, supra note 1, at 2 (stating that international public law exists with
its stated goal); Kennedy & Tennant, supra note 5, at 418.
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problem of indeterminacy. 5' This problem of indeterminacy may
display itself in different fashions. Namely, the indeterminacy may
arise from decision-making that is not predictable, which is particu-
larly troubling in the vast array of international context in which
issues may arise. In addition, indeterminacy may arise from un-
predictable value clashes. 2
Professor David Kennedy, quite possibly the leading explorer of
the traditional paradigm, has apparently come to a similar conclu-
sion. He described the methodology of international public law as
giving the appearance of movements from imagined origins to a
desired end, but in actuality existing precariously and ever fluctuat-
ing among the constructed imagined points. 53 This critique of the
positivist paradigm also recognizes that a considerable amount of
cynicism stems from the traditional discourses anointment of the
sovereign state as the core being of international order.54 Related
to this critique is the argument that the dominant liberal tradition
of international law also produces policies and practices that are
skewed against progressive politics. 55  In part because the new
stream approach has introduced issues of consequence, such as
culture and race, that had previously not been addressed, this pa-
per will further explore this new wave of critiques.56
The new stream or new approaches group has attempted to shift
the forms of international legal scholarship from analysis of doc-
trine to acceptance of the determinative quality of culture and pol-
icy. The leader and founder of the New Approaches to Interna-
tional Law, or NAIL group, David Kennedy, recently described the
traditional international law theorist as being constantly worried
"' See, e.g., Peter Halewood, Violence and the International Word, 60 ALB. L. REV. 565, 569
(1997) (arguing that positivist and naturalist theories of international law collapse because
of indeterminacy).
52 See Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78
CAL. L. REV. 1441, 1472-73 (1990) (arguing that value clashes occur because law is same as
politics).
"' See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 38 (defining distinction between substance and process
in international law).
54 See id.
' See Carty, supra note 29, at 66 (focusing on contradictions in international law dis-
course).
'6 See Cass, supra note 1, at 341-42 (arguing that difference between mainstream and
new stream" changed perception about international law and public policy); Simpson,
supra note 30, at 615 (explaining that "newstream" scholars shift focus from doctrine to
culture).
5' See Simpson, supra note 30, at 615 (stating that Kennedy has established new school
of legal study).
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about the ability of international law to accurately reflect the sover-
eign's will and to bring sovereign behavior within its ken.5s He
added that the traditional theorist is virtually always searching for
better methods to enforce norms in international society and feels
the need to defend international law even when enforcement
seems unlikely.59
Kennedy notes that for the traditional theorist, law and culture
occupy different stages of development. In fact, cultural differ-
ences precede the move to the moral high ground of the law.61
Kennedy argues that the internationalist seeks to build bonds
among states by being agnostic about culture, by having no cul-
ture.62 Another writer similarly observes western legal theory views
law as an autonomous, abstract, and rational entity distinct from
63the society it regulates. To the internationalist, the problem of
culture disappears because it is equated with the notion of the na-
64tion-state. In what perhaps would be of interest to critical race
theorists, one of Kennedy's most recent works emphasized this
point by means of the narrative mode of discourse, also referred to
as explanation by metaphor. This story or metaphor will be the
starting point of a movement that my colleague Tayal Mahmud in a
panel at this conference somewhat fancifully characterized as a
RAIL or Race Approaches to International Law.
In order to reveal the shortcomings of the traditionalist, Ken-
nedy asks us to envision the traditionalist as a photographer, and
the sovereign as the subject of his photograph.65 Kennedy likens
the traditionalist focus on the global to the local to that of a pho-
tographer's adjustment of the lens to capture the lake behind Aunt
Betty's head.66 Like Uncle Chuck, whose insistence on getting into
the picture would be annoying to the photographer, culture throws
' See David Kennedy, New Approaches to Comparative Law: Comparativism and International
Governance, 1997 Utah L. Rev. 545 (describing weaknesses in mainstream international law
theory).
See id.
See id. (discussing precursors to mainstream international law).
61 See id.
6' See id.
Ruth Gordon, Saving Failed States: Sometimes a Neocolonialist Nation, 12 AM. U.J. INT'L
L. & POL'Y 903, 971 (1997) (questioning supremacy of Western views to detriment of "multi-
cultural dialogue").
See id. at 967-68 (arguing that international law is "sovereign-centric").
SeeKennedy, supra note 58, at 551.
See id.
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a wringer into the international scene or snapshot.67 According to
Kennedy, culture may embody a host of issues and identities -
ethnic, religious, familial, gender, racial, and indigenous.6 Mean-
while, Aunt Betty, much like the sovereign is, as the result of the
intrusion, no longer the focal point of the picture. She is reduced
to merely a participant in the picture. At this point Kennedy's
story essentially ends and a RAIL critique would begin.
What could RAIL effectuate?
A Race Approach to International Law could have the effect of
including voices of people of color, even if they may be part of the
intellectual elite that heretofore had not been adequately heard.
While these voices may not represent all race perspectives, they
may force the dominant gaze to consider differing perceptions of
reality. A RAIL critique would invite race-centered international
discourses from both within and without the United States. This is
not to say that there have not been voices from the third world.
However, there are numerous cultures within the United States. In
a sense, because of the amalgam of cultures, nationalities, and
races within this country, the United States has within itself the so-
called first through third world, and as many as possible of those
voices should be heard. The multicultural make-up of this country
virtually ensures that international issues will affect people in this
country. In particular, the voices of immigrants whose family
originate from the so-called third world are often directly as well as
indirectly affected by international law, but are rarely examined.
Some examples of this impact include the recent incarnations of
immigration and free trade issues arising in this country's relations
with Mexico.69 As the Chinese exclusion cases also demonstrate,
the racialized history of U.S. immigration laws has literally affected
the color of the migration of people into this country, who all too
often live with immutable characteristics of both citizen and alien
or foreigner status.70 Similarly, the "free-trade benefits" of NAFTA,
67 See id.
See id.
See Gil Gott, Critical Race Globalism? The Complex Relationship of Race and Globalization,
33 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1503 (2000); Tanya K. Hermnndez, The Construction of Race and Class
Buffers in the Structure of Immigration Controls and Laws, 76 OR. L. REv. 731, 732-33 (1997)
(stating that immigration laws with Mexico create middle class buffer); Kevin R. Johnson,
Race, the Immigration and Domestic Race Relations: A Magic Mirror into the Heart of Darkness, 73
IND. L.J. 1111, 1136-38 (1998) (describing "war" on illegal aliens from Mexico).
"o See Neil Gotanda, Asia American Rights and the "Miss Saigon Syndrome," in ASIAN
AMERICANS AND THE SUPREME COURT: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1088-96 (Hyung-Chan Kim
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which do not include "free or unrestricted migration," implicate
the alien as well as those here who, because of race and ethnicity,
are all too often treated as aliens.71
A RAIL critique could expand upon NAIL's cultural critique
generally and Critical Race and LatCrit theories' focus on race in
particular. It will likely be similar to the feminist international cri-
tique by seeking to examine the effect of international legal proc-
esses and norms that emanate from a western and accordingly
white Eurocentric construction.72
A RAIL approach would also likely reject the assumption that
there is some overarching neutral standpoint, a nonpolitical aca-
demic standard that allows this method of politics to be discussed
from the outside of particular methodological or political contro-
versies.13 RAIL will likely question the normativity of the nation-
state since it often is a mere reflection of majority voices and given
the dominant international structure all too often promotes a form
• 74
of European or western domination. As was recently observed,
"international law owes its origins to European Cultural norms
which maintained that nation's owed duties to others of the same
race." 75 "International law was a distillation of European cultural
norms into a system of rules."76 A clear division of the world into
European and non-European realms marked international law.
RAIL could advance a variety of goals forcing the dominant per-
spective to appreciate the impact of European domination on the
international discourse, an issue that has long been masked in the
ed., 1992) (describing problems with racial stratification); Ediberto Romhn, The Alien-Citizen
Paradox: and other Consequences of U.S. Colonialism, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 1, 7 (1999) (describ-
ing citizenship of native-born Chinese).
71 See Kevin R. Johnson, An Essay on Immigration, Citizenship, and U.S./Mexico Relations:
The Tale of Two Treaties, 5 Sw. J.L. & TRADE AM. 121, 122-26 (1998) (discussing operation
"wetback," in which Mexicans were deported by U.S. authorities in 1950s).
' See Charlesworth et al., supra note 3, at 613 (exposing gender bias of American legal
theory).
See Martti Koskenniemi, Letter to the Editor of the Symposium, 93 AM.J. INT'L L. 352, 354
(1999) (stating that international law is hopelessly old-fashioned with formalistic argu-
ments).
7' See Dianne Otto, Subalternity and International Law: The Problems of Global Community
and the Incommensurability of Difference, 5 SoC. & LEGAL STUD. 337, 339 (1996) (arguing that
there is no one representative nation-state).
7' Gordon, supra note 63, at 936 (describing how Westerners did not value rights of
indigenous people).
76 Note, Aspiration and Control: International Legal Rhetoric and the Essentialization of Cul-
ture, 106 HARv. L. REv. 723, 733 (1993) (describing how culture distilled Europeans from
non-Europeans).
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facade of neutrality. Such an emphasis will focus on the impact
international policies or rules have on racial minorities, thereby
continually providing a race conscious voice in international law."
In a sense, this approach would respond to Elizabeth Iglesias' call
to expand the parameters of the antisubordination agenda of criti-
cal theory by highlighting the myriads ways in which white suprem-
acy is embedded in the structures of privilege.'8 Heretofore critical
race critics have focused on domestic struggles for racial justice.79
While this Article's call for a race conscious examination is perhaps
a novel approach, it is one that has already begun with scholars,
such as Antony Anghie, 0 Ruth Gordon,8 and Robert Williams,"
who have examined a series of international issues from a critical
race perspective."' This work is an effort to acknowledge this
movement that is in its fledgling, as well as formally recognize the
international critical race theory efforts as RAIL.
A race-focused discourse will likely depart from NAIL in the na-
ture of the focus of the dialogue. While a discourse on culture
could include race, issues of race would be relegated to a compo-
nent part of the "cultural" focus. However, the amalgam of issues
that can be included in the term culture fail to sufficiently capture
" See Charlesworth et al., supra note 3, at 634 (noting Eurocentric view of international
law).
m See Elizabeth Iglesias, Out of the Shadow: Making Intersections in and Between Asian Pacific
American Critical Legal Scholarship and Latinalo Critical Theory, 19 B.C. THIRD WoRLD L.J. 349,
358-64 (1998) (discussing how minorities display common trait in that white majority domi-
nates culture and politics).
See id. at 381.
SeeAntony Anghie, "The Heart at My Home"." Colonialism, Environmental Damage, and the
Nauru Case, 34 HARV. INT'L L.J. 445, 499 (1993) (describing failure and collapse of main-
stream theory).
" See Gordon, supra note 63, at 963 (using critical race perspective to re-examine inter-
national law).
" See Robert A. Williams,Jr., Encounters on the Frontiers of International Human Rights Law:
Redefining the Terms of Indigenous Peoples' Survival in the World, 1990 DUKE L.J. 660, 666-67
(1990) (using critical race perspective to address indigenous peoples' rights).
See Isabelle R. Gunning, Arrogant Perception, World Traveling and Multicultural Femi-
nism: The Case of Female Genital Surgeries, in CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A READER 352, 353-54
(Adrien K. Wing ed., 1997) (stating negative impacts of ethnocentrism); Hope Lewis, Lion-
heart Gals Facing the Dragon: The Human Rights of Inter/national Black Women in the United States,
76 OR. L. REv. 567, 575 (1997) (combining critical race theory with international human
rights); Henry J. Richardson, III, "Failed States," Self-Determination, and Preventive Diplomacy:
Colonialist Nostalgia and Democratic Expectations, 10 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 1, 7 (1996) (ar-
guing that "Failed States" should not pass into international law); Natsu Taylor Saito, Beyond
Civil Rights: Considering "Third Generation" International Human Rights Law in the United States,
28 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REv. 387, 404-05 (1997) (using critical race perspective to exam-
ine human rights issues).
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the importance of race in many international issues. Much in the
same way the feminists recognized the importance and need for a
gendered emphasis, there is similarly a need for a race focus. In a
recent work on the subject, Professor Gott emphasized the need to
"reinvigorate the analysis of global white supremacy and, in so do-
ing, inject Critical Race and LatCrit approaches into the growing
mass of critical perspective on globalization."
8 4
RAIL would emphasize conversations and dialogue, rather than
the production of a single, triumphant truth . RAIL would assert
and focus on the importance of race, which would contain an in-
tersectional component86 by including, out of necessity, other re-
lated areas such as gender in international law. The intersection
between RAIL and a feminist critique on certain international is-
sues will create paradigm shifts from a RAIL discourse critiquing
the traditional framework. Unlike a critique of white supremacy,
when addressing an international issue that implicates race as well
as gender that are oppositionally situated, such as in the case of
Female Genital Mutilation, a RAIL critique would have to struggle
with its goals and any proposed solution. When addressing contro-
versial issues such as Female Genital Mutilation ("FGM") a RAIL
critique would have to struggle with the conflicts concerning sov-
ereignty, cultural relativism, and European or Western paternalism
on the one side and human dignity, health, inviolability and sanc-
tity of the body to be free from what many believe is a form of tor-
ture. In such a delicate debate a RAIL discourse may tread dan-
gerously close to sanctioning violence or replicating western con-
structions of the so-called "other" on the third world. The question
will likely turn on whether there are truly universal foundations to
international law. In a sense a FGM examination from a RAIL cri-
tique will be another question of the moral foundationalism of the
law. From this writer's perspective, obviously tainted by western
norms, an exhaustive RAIL critique of FGM would ultimately con-
clude that the sanctity of human dignity and inviolability should
See Gott, supra note 69, at_.
Charlesworth et al., supra note 3, at 614-15 (questioning why feminism is not part of
new stream legal theory).
'See generally Kimberl6 Crenshaw, Race, Gender, and Sexual Harrassment, 65 S. CAL. L.
REV. 1467 (1992) (introducing concept of intersectionality which arises when systems of
subordination meet).
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overcome concerns of sovereignty and western paternalism. 7 If
successful, a race discourse could produce a reformation of inter-
national law that could insure all people, including those of the
third world within and outside of the United States, are addressed
and hopefully respected in international law. 8 Just as NAIL re-
minds us of the importance of culture and the feminist methods
remind us of the need to consider gender, RAIL would bring to
the forefront the significance of race in the international dis-
course. For instance, a RAIL critique would acknowledge the hu-
manitarian interests behind the United Nations' military involve-
ment in Bosnia, but would question the lack of similar interest in
the taking of innocent lives in Rhwanda, and the utter silence of
the domestic media in addressing these apparently fungible peo-
ple.
In this sense, RAIL would enhance both NAIL and a fledgling
discourse known as TWAIL or Third World Approaches to Interna-
tional Law. The TWAIL discourse, which is difficult to describe
and research because of the lack of easily identifiable writings
which would be considered TWAIL works, 89 is predominantly
viewed as stemming from scholars originally mentored by NAIL
founders, but who originate from various countries and are engag-
ing in a third world perspective to the international law critique.9°
Nonetheless, a RAIL critique can be understood by analogism to
87 See Karen Engle, Female Subjects of Public International Law: Human Rights and the Exotic
Other Female, 26 NEW ENG. L. REV. 1509, 1516 (1992) (arguing that when institutions ignore
differences between men and women, women's issues will be ignored); Hope Lewis, Between
IRUA and "Female Genital Mutilation" Feminist Human Rights Discourse and the Cultural Divide, 8
HARV. HUM. RTs. J. 1, 10-12 (1995) (stating that women's concept of dignity outweighs
sovereignty concerns); see alsoJaimee K. Wellerstein, In the Name of Tradition: Eradicating the
Harmful Practice of Female Genital Mutilation, 22 LOY. LA. INT'L & COMp. L. REv. 99, 113-15
(1999) (arguing that because genital mutilation is such culturally-bound practice, U.N. must
work with individual countries to abandon custom).
' See Charlesworth et al., supra note 3, at 644 (noting that restructuring international
law could lead to revisions of state responsibility).
See generally ANTONIO CASSESE, INTERNATIONAL LAW IN A DIVIDED WORLD 105 (1986)
(describing unifying factors of TWAIL research); THIRD WORLD ATTITUDES TOWARD
INTERNATIONAL LAw: AN INTRODUCTION xi (F. Snyder & S. Sathirathai eds., 1987) [hereinaf-
ter THIRD WORLD ATTITUDES] (stating that fluctuation of new states makes "Third World"
fluctuating concept).
' See Kennedy & Tennant, supra note 5, at 418-20 (describing volume of scholarly work
from third world countries).
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the manner in which critical race theory is perceived as a response
to critical legal studies."1
RAIL, as alluded to before, follows Critical Race and LatCrit the-
ory by emphasizing that which is at the heart of what NAIL's Ken-
nedy described as culture.2 Instead of using the broad but cau-
tious term of culture, RAIL would seek to have the international
focus on the underlying and equally broad component relevant to
virtually all legal discourse, race and the myriad of all its construc-
tions. This is a significant contribution in that when we talk of cul-
ture, of minorities, of difference, of colonialism, of the first and
third world, we are engaging in a discourse about race. Until this
moment much of international discourse on race has masked the
importance of race through the use of these other labels and has
avoided race because many find it discomforting.
To illustrate how RAIL could force the global discourse to face
the uncomfortable, let us return to Professor Kennedy's metaphor
about the picture. A RAIL approach would add to the vista an is-
sue that is so immersed with racial implications, but whose exis-
tence amazingly is rarely openly addressed.
When last we discussed Aunt Betty's picture, Kennedy compared
Uncle Chuck's insistence on entering the frame to culture thrust-
ing itself unto the traditional discourse. RAIL enhances this image
by reminding us that part of the international picture involves all
sorts of people of color that are too often, while not in the picture,
the subjects of Aunt Betty's writings, the white or European de-
scription of the picture. RAIL in other words would be akin to a
"color-advanced" film product, which would ensure that the viewer
captures a truer picture of what has transpired.
Furthermore, by tapping into the antisubordinate, anti-
essentialist nature of Critical Race and LatCrit theory, RAIL would
force us to ask a few more questions. For example, if Uncle Chuck
were African American, Latino, or Asian American, would he be in
" Much of the TWAIL movement originates from the Harvard Law School's Confer-
ences on New Approaches to International Law, in which some workshops focused on ad-
dressing the outsider's perspectives to traditional international law. The TWAIL working
groups attendees reviewed works from such renowned theorists as Edward Said and Frantz
Fanon. These papers, not unlike certain NAIL critiques, questioned the Eurocentric per-
spective of nineteenth and twentieth century history and attempted to debunk the nostalgic
romanticism associated with the age of imperialism.
'2 I here seek to take ownership of the outsider perspective to international law if for no
other reason that TWAIL other than discussion groups arising in workshops held by Harvard
professors at Harvard, to me, does not qualify as at least a scholarly movement.
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the picture? If so, then why did it take so long to include Uncle
Chuck in the frame, which by analogy could very well be the theo-
retical discourse? Given the delay, will he ever truly be a partici-
pant in the practical discourse - will he ever be allowed to take
the picture? Which, given the amount of control the photogra-
pher has over the final product, begs the question; who is currently
taking the picture?
93
While at first blush, this RAIL perspective as a theoretical prog-
eny of NAIL appears to be narrow, upon closer examination it
would provide a fuller discourse by forcing traditionalists and other
participants in the method debate to face the reality of race, which
does not neatly fall within the paradigm of the sovereign. A RAIL
approach would challenge the assumptions of other methodologi-
cal approaches. Specifically, it would question whether issues of
race continue to be marginalized. In so doing RAIL would invite
all of the outsiders' voices.94 Unlike other approaches, it would not
necessarily replicate the hierarchy it seeks to question as it was not
conceived by inside international intelligentsia95 and arguably did
not originate in Europe or Cambridge, Massachusetts.
Functionally speaking RAIL could provide a critique of a con-
crete problem that is faced or avoided in the international com-
munity. Contrary to both the traditionalists and those that critique
them, a RAIL critique would seek to focus on race in order to add
an emphasis to new approaches. The following is an example of a
RAIL discourse concerning the international issue of colonialism.
By looking at the relatively small amount of race-focused discourse
in the area of self-determination movements, 96 a RAIL discourse
93 As this article argues, the photographer, until this moment, has been the white male
traditionalist.
" See, e.g., Rosi Braidotti, The Exile, The Nomad, and The Migrant: Reflections on Interna-
tional Feminism, 15 WOMEN'S STUD. INT'L F. 7, 9 (1992) (embracing importance of multiple
literacies); Isabelle Gunning, Arrogant Perception, World-Travelling and Multicultural Feminism:
The Case of Female Genital Surgeries, 23 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 189, 191 (1991-92) (recog-
nizing importance of views of others within identified group).
' See Kennedy, supra note 1, at 2 (demonstrating public laws' repetition of simple
narrative structure).
w See HANNAH ARENDT, ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIANISM 1-10 (1995) (discussing role of
anti-Semitism in Nazi movement). Colonialism is defined as a relationship of domination
between an indigenous (or forcibly imported) majority and a minority, of foreign invaders.
The fundamental decisions affecting the lives of the colonized people are made and imple-
mented by the colonial rulers in pursuit of interests that are often defined in a distant me-
tropolis. Rejecting cultural compromises with the colonized population, the colonizers are
convinced of their own superiority and of their ordained mandate to rule. See JURGEN
OSTERHAMMEL, COLONIALISM 16-17 (1999).
A Race Approach to International Law
could bring to the forefront an issue that has been, in the past,
merely a component of a cultural discourse.
This approach would enhance the dialogue in that, as Antony
Anghie observed, "colonialism and the developing country experi-
ence is one that still remains to be elaborated and theorized in
terms of its role in the making of international law. 97 And yet, with
the exception of certain scholars in fields outside the law, such as
Edward Said and Rubin Weston,98 and within the legal academia,
such as Ruth Gordon,99 Antony Anghie,'00 and Henry Richardson,'01
in the context of colonial discourse race has been an all too often
marginalized theme.
Despite this marginalization, issues of race permeate interna-
tional and colonial discourse.10'2 Issues of race have arisen subtly in
a form of western paternalism that was and is at the heart of colo-
nial discourse. This form of paternalism actually legitimized the
institution of colonialism through nineteenth century notions such
as manifest destiny and the white man's burden. More recently, in
the League of Nations Mandate System and the United Nations
Trusteeship System the theme was no less pervasive. Using terms
such as "advanced," "matured," "sacred trust," "civilized," and
"failed states," international bodies have used thinly veiled euphe-
misms for race in their international law lexicon. 10 3 These loaded
terms have typically legitimized western determinations of when
people of color could be endowed with the basic human right to
rule themselves.
For instance, the United States' major twentieth century colonial
expansion began as a consequence of the Spanish-American War.
0 4
Kennedy & Tennant, supra note 5, at 422.
See EDWARD SAID, CULTURE AND IMPERIALISM (1993); RUBIN WESTON, RACISM IN U.S.
IMPERIALISM: THE INFLUENCE OF RACIAL ASSUMPTIONS ON AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY, 1893-
1946 (1972).
See Gordon, supra note 63; Ruth Gordon, Some Legal Problems With Trusteeship, 28
CORNELL INT'L L.J. 301 (1995).
" See Anghie, supra note 80.
See HenryJ. Richardson, III, Gulf Crisis and African-American Interest Under International
Law, 87 AM.J. INT'L L. 42 (1993).
' See, e.g., FRANK FUREDI, THE SILENT WAR: IMPERIALISM AND THE CHANGING
PERCEPTION OF RACE 236-38 (1998); SAID, supra note 98, at xxiv-xxvii.
'0' See Ruth Gordon, United Nations Intervention in Internal Conflicts: Iraq, Somalia, and
Beyond, 15 MICH. J. INT'L L. 519, 540 n.110 (1994) (noting that powerful "metropolitan"
nations would freely intervene in affairs of current and former colonies); id. at 545 (associat-
ing "colonialism" with racism).
AN See Treaty of Paris, Dec. 10, 1898, U.S.-Spain, art. IX, 30 Star. 1754, 1759 (giving
United States Congress sole right to determine "civil rights and political status" of "native
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One of the repercussions of these conquests was the development
of a United States Supreme Court jurisprudence that embraced
colonialism. In a series of decisions known as the Insular cases the
Supreme Court affirmed colonialism via issues of race and racial
constructions. °5 And yet, few legal scholars and even fewer law
school courses address this constitutional development. 106
The Insular Cases occurred after the Spanish-American war, in a
time of intense governmental debate over the fate of the territories
acquired by the United States as booty of war.'°7 While the debate
centered on the largest possessions, Puerto Rico and the Philip-
pines, the Island of Guam was also acquired.' 8 Prior to this period
the United States philosophy towards expansion as evidenced by
the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 was acquisition of territories with
the intention of future incorporation as states of the Union. 9
However, unlike its previous acquisitions, following the Spanish-
American war, the United States occupied "offshore" territories in
the Caribbean and the Pacific that were inhabited by people of
color who had different cultures and spoke different languages. "
0
This distinction was the basis for the United States' development
of a different approach towards incorporation with respect to these
territories. Ultimately, the U.S. decided to take up a share of the
white man's burden, and acquire distant lands while maintaining
inhabitants" of lands ceded by Spain); UNITED STATES, 1 ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE WAR
DEPARTMENT 15 (1902), reprinted in DOCUMENTS ON THE CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF
PUERTO RICO 55 (2d ed. 1964) (noting acquisition of Puerto Rico by United States in Span-
ish-American War); see also JUAN R. TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO RICO:
THE DOCTRINE OF SEPARATE AND UNEQUAL 3 n.1 (1985) (noting United Supreme Court
jurisprudence affirming Congressional policies in Puerto Rico),
Im See, e.g., De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 174, 196-97 (1901) (stating that Congress has
power over acquired territories and their people fettered only by Constitution); Downes v.
Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 279 (1901) (plurality opinion) (commenting upon "serious" conse-
quences if inhabitants of unincorporated territories or their children become citizens en
masse).
W See TORRUELLA, supra note 104, at 3-4. The leading scholarly work on the United
States's relationship with its territorial possessions, Defining Status: A Comprehensive Analysis of
United States Territorial Relations, for instance, is largely devoid of any references to the racial
implications of the United States conquests. While this work is truly impressive and I have
learned much from it, the book only discusses race in four pages of a 757 page book and
largely focuses on racism among the inhabitants of the territories. See ARNOLD LEIBOWITZ,
DEFINING STATUS: A COMPREHENSIVE ANALYSIS OF UNITED STATES TERRITORIAL RELATIONS
102-05 (1989).
'0 SeeJoSt A. CABRANES, CITIZENSHIP AND THE AMERICAN EMPIRE 4-5 (1979).
M See LEIBOWITZ, supra note 106, at 17.
See id. at 6.
"' See id. at 4; see also Roman, supra note 70, at 7.
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the inhabitants of said territories in a subordinated status. From
the statements of congressional leaders to the decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, the determinative role that the race
of the inhabitants played in this debate is unequivocal. "'
For example, at a time when Filipinos were portrayed as "physi-
cal weaklings of low stature, with black skin, closely curling hair,
flat noses, thick lips, and large clumsy feet,"". Representative Payne
argued for preferential treatment for Puerto Rico via the census
reports which demonstrated that Whites, generally full-blooded
white people, descendants of the Spaniards, outnumbered by
nearly two-to-one the combined total of Negroes and mulattoes.1
3
Similarly, Representative Spight stated, "how different the case of
the Philippine Islands.... The inhabitants are of wholly different
races of people from ours - Asiatics, Malays, Negroes and mixed
blood." 4  Representative George Gilbert further delineated the
role of race when he warned against "open [ing] wide the door by
which these Negroes and Asiatics can pour like the locusts of Egypt
into this country."" 5 Senator William Bate concurred with this sen-
timent when he proclaimed "let us not take the Philippines in our
embrace to keep them simply because we are able to do so .... Let
us beware of those mongrels of the East with breath of pestilence
and touch of leprosy."" 6
The race debate concerning these territories is not limited to
legislative history."7 It also became part of United States Supreme
Court jurisprudence. The Insular Cases, as mentioned earlier, cre-
ated this permanency by endorsing territorial expansion and le-
gitimizing colonialism. This effectively proclaimed American im-
perialism as constitutionally permissible. In Downes v. Bidwell,"
Justice Brown, writing for the plurality warned: "If the[] inhabi-
. See CABRANES, supra note 107, at 29-31; Efren Rivera Ramos, The Legal Construction of
American Colonialism: The Insular Cases (1901-1922), 65 REV. JUR. U. P.R. 225, 235 (1996); see
also Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 282 (1901) (asserting "that in the annexation of outly-
ing... possessions grave questions will arise from differences of race" that would not arise
"in the annexation of contiguous territory inhabited only by people of the same race, or by
scattered bodies of Indians").
"' 33 CONG. REc. 3613 (1900) (statement of Sen. Bate) (quoting from Report of Phil-
ippine Commission to President).
. Id. at 1941 (statement of Rep. Payne).
11 Id. at 2105 (statement of Rep. Spight).
"5 Id. at 2172 (remarks of Rep. Gilbert).
n6 Id. at 3616 (remarks of Sen. Bate).
.. See Kennedy & Tennant, supra note 5, at 419.
"' 182 U.S. 244 (1901).
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tants [of offshore territorial acquisitions] do not become, immedi-
ately upon annexation, citizens of the United States, their children
thereafter born, whether savages of civilized, are such .... If such
be their status, the consequences will be extremely serious."" 9 Jus-
tice Brown further elaborated upon the prevalent Anglo-Saxon
nativistic thought:
If those possessions are inhabited by alien races, differing from us
in religion, customs, laws, methods of taxation and modes of
thought, the administration of government and justice, according
to Anglo-Saxon principles, may for a time be impossible; and the
question at once arises whether large concessions ought not to be
made for a time, that, ultimately, our own theories may be carried
out, and the blessings of a free government under the Constitu-
tion extended to them. We decline to hold that there is anything
in the Constitution to forbid such action. 1
°
Justice White's opinion concurring in judgment further justified
disparate treatment by warning against "the evil of immediate in-
corporation.' 2' This shibboleth would open up the borders to
"millions of inhabitants of alien territory" who could overthrow
"the whole structure of the government." 2  Justice White's racially
based incorporation doctrine is still effectively the law of the land
and forms the basis for the existing disparate treatment of the resi-
dents of America's island dependencies.
Racial undercurrents were also at the heart of the global move-
ment against colonialism, through the right of self-
determination. 12 3 Self-determination is regarded as the right of a
people to pursue freely, absent outside pressure, their political and
legal status as a separate entity.' 24 Self-determination is grounded
... Id. at 279.
"' Id. at 287.
12 Id. at 313.
12 id.
" See Gordon, supra note 99, at 317-23.
124 See id. at 320-21; Otto Kimminich, A "Federal Right" of Self-Determination?, in MODERN
LAW OF SELF-DETERMINATION 85, 85 (Christian Tomuschat ed., 1993) (determining "right to
self-determination ... as the right of people or a nation to determine freely by themselves
without outside pressure their political and legal status as a separate entity") (quoting Frank
Przetacznik, The Basic Collective Human Right to Self-Determination of Peoples and Nations as a
Prerequisite for Peace: Its Philosophical Background and Practical Application, 691 REVUE DE DROIT
INT'L DE SCIENCES DIPLOMATIQUES ET POLITIQUE 259, 263 (1991)); Ediberto Romdn, Em-
pire Forgotten: The United States Colonization of Puerto Rico, 42 VILL. L. REV. 1119, 1127-61
(1998) (examining principle of self-determination with reference to dominion of United
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on human rights precepts that recognize that all people are equally
entitled to be in control of their own destinies. The principle is
based on ideas of human freedom and equality, and is, as such, at
odds with colonial rule or any other similar form of foreign deter-
mination. "5 As Professor Ruth Gordon notes, however, after World
War I, the principle was applicable only to certain Europeans.
1
'
26
Any semblance of self-determination for non-Europeans was em-
bodied in the League of Nations Mandate System.2 7 Article 22 of
the League of Nations Covenant called upon "advanced" guardians
over certain colonies and territories that were incapable of self-
rule. 128 These people who were categorized as incapable of self-rule
were, as luck would have it, in many instances nonwestern Europe-
ans, and in virtually every other instance residents of the third
world.
12 9
The reality is that, rhetoric about self-determination aside, under
the framework of the mandate system, self-determination was es-
sentially unavailable for the less-advanced people of the Third
World.130  Instead, these people, absent their consent, were en-
trusted to the tutelage of "advanced nations." Typically European
or descendants of Europeans were responsible for the well-being
and development of their charges and carried out this responsibil-
ity as a "sacred trust" of civilization.
2
'
While the United Nations Charter referred to and adopted the
principle of self-determination, it simultaneously retained vestiges
of the subordinating mandate system through the Trusteeship Sys-
tem. So much so that Chapters XI and XII of the United Nations
Charter established that self-determination for non-self-governing
territories was to proceed at a pace dictated by the colonial admin-
istrators. Article 73(b), for instance, called upon the signatories
"to develop self-government . . .according to the particular cir-
States over people of Puerto Rico); see also Lung-Chu Chen, Self-Determination and World
Public Order, 66 NOTRE DAMEL. REV. 1287, 1291-97 (1991) (identifying challenges facingself-
determination under international law); Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic
Governance, 86 AM.J. INT'L L. 46, 52-56 (1992) (tracing roots of doctrine).
'0 SeeJames Anaya, The Native Hawaiian People and International Human Rights Law: To-
ward a Remedy for Past and Continuing Wrongs, 22 GA. L. REV. 309, 320 (1994).
"" See Gordon, supra note 63, at 935.
2 See Franck, supra note 124, at 53-54.
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26 See Franck, supra note 124, at 54.
" See id.
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cumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying
stages of advancement."032 Article 76 likewise included a duty "to
promote the... advancement of the inhabitants of the trust terri-
tories, and their progressive development towards self-government
or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circum-
stances of each territory and its peoples."
33
Again, the signatories of the charter were the so-called advanced
nations and those who were to be "developed" were people of the
third world. The largely demeaning and insulting proclamations
contained in the international documents have a Messianic tone
that reflects the self-proclaimed advanced nations' self-depiction as
the White Messiahs, who utilize paternalism to perpetuate the so-
called white man's burden of manifest destiny. Indeed, even the
methodology of the trusteeship system, with terms such as ad-
vanced nations and sacred trust, is brimming with paternalism and,
despite the countervailing nuances, resembles the nineteenth cen-
tury's white man's burden of manifest destiny.
However, a change in the face of the international community
occurred shortly after World War II via the formation of several
"socialist democracies" in Eastern Europe as well as the liberation
of a number of countries subjected to colonial domination. This
latter group gained political independence as a result of the ero-
sion of the colonial empires of France, the United Kingdom, Bel-
gium, the Netherlands, Portugal, and Italy.134  One scholar ob-
served that this liberation resulted from a series of forces including
indigenous liberation efforts, the increasing cost of empire, and a
philosophical shift in the perception of empire by those doing the
subjugating as well as the international community generally.35
Those nations liberated during the first two decades after the war,
including Syria, Lebanon, India, Pakistan, Burma, Libya, Tunisia,
Morocco, Sudan, Ghana, Malaya, and Guinea, 36 showed, as Anto-
nio Cassese has noted, "striking similarities to the emancipation of
slaves which had taken place in the second half of the nineteenth
century in the U.S. In both cases the people gaining emancipation
... U.N. CHARTER art. 73, para. 6.
" Id. art. 76, para. 6.
"' See CASSESE, supra note 89, at 67.
See Neta C. Crawford, Decolonization as an International Norm: The Evolution of Practices,
Argument, and Beliefs, in EMERGING NORMS OF JUSTIFIED INTERVENTION 37, 38 (Laura W.
Reed & Carl Kaysen eds., 1993).
' See id.
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were black and in both instances freedom came as a result of a war"
which was not waged for the purpose of freedom from slavery or
colonial rule, and which the black or colonial peoples did not be-
gin or dictate."7
As a result of this liberation movement political life in the inter-
national community changed dramatically as western countries
were no longer in a state of complete domination.1m Not surpris-
ingly, the newly formed developing countries, which were largely
non-western and non-white, recognized a unifying factor in their
desire to end colonial rule and the attendant western focus. 1'3 9 Dur-
ing the transition period of international structure the newly cre-
ated countries recognized that the forms of modernity that were
imbedded in international thought did not fully respond to their
needs. These new countries, backed by socialist states, prompted a
revision of the rules of international law.'4 Among the major
changes that resulted from the creation of the new countries was
reconfiguration of the legal focus of the United Nations. Notions
of self-determination, decolonization, and racial equality became
major points of the international community's legal agenda. 4' For-
tunately, some of the goals on this agenda were met. For instance,
in 1960 and 1966, three covenants on human rights included the
current substantive components of the right of self-
determination. 4 2 These resolutions were followed by other proc-
lamations concerning the right of self-determination.
As this brief portrayal of recent international movements in the
area of de-colonization demonstrates, it was only after people of
color were free from the binds of colonialism that decolonization
became a focus of the international community. More recently,
several scholars have recognized that current discussions concern-
ing colonialism in the context of the failed states phenomenon has
had an equally racialized tone. 43 The following discussion will
demonstrate the very different solutions proposed by those schol-
"' See CASSESE, supra note 89, at 66.
See id. at 68.
See id.
See id. at 70.
14 See id. at 72.
"' See G.A. Res. 2625 (xxv), U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 28, Annex, Preamble, at
123, U.N. Doc. A/8082 (1970); GA. Res. 2200 (xxi), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16,
Annex, Part I, art. 1, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); GA Res. 1541, U.N. GAOR, 15th
Sess., Supp. No. 16, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960).
" See, e.g., Gordon, supra note 63, at 903-40; Richardson, supra note 83, at 1-28.
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ars within the traditional framework versus those who have exam-
ined the problem from a critical race perspective or framework.
The concept of failed states has arisen in large part due to the
phenomenon of disintegrating, collapsed, or failing governments
of recently decolonized African countries such as Somalia, Rwanda,
and Liberia. 44 The concept of a failed state or government arises
when, due to civil strife, war, or other calamity, a country's gov-
ernment is unable to discharge basic governmental functions. 145
These failed functions include an inability to: maintain control
over its territory; provide oversight of its own resources; collect
revenue; maintain an adequate infrastructure; and maintain law
and order. While several solutions have been proposed to address
this problem, most have suggested that the failed governments re-
linquish their authority to the United Nations or similar group of
nation-states.' 46 They have proposed a form of trusteeship or con-
servatorship,47 which may last for decades or until the problem is
fixed. '48 Professors Gordon and Richardson have responded to
these proposed solutions by observing that they are a call to return
to the paternalistic and cultural elitism that justified colonialism in
the first instance. '49 Instead of focusing on an inclusive paradigm
that will incorporate the views of those directly affected and pro-
pose cooperative diplomacy, the primary response was to return to
foreign subjugation. As this ongoing dilemma demonstrates, even
during these "enlightened times" when the third world is in trou-
ble, the first and primary solution is to return these "failed" groups
to the supervision of the advanced nations.
Thus, despite the fact that it was not directly mentioned, race has
been and still remains an essential component in the de-
colonization movement which was geared towards the granting of
freedom to all peoples as well as the discourse on how to treat the
recently de-colonized who are facing serious problems. As these
'4 See Gordon, supra note 63, at 913-16; see also Ruth Gordon, Growing Constitutions, 1 U.
PA.J. CONST. L. 528, 533-36 (1999) (focusing on Somalia).
" See Gordon, supra note 63, at 915.
146 See, e.g., Gerald B. Helman & Steven R. Ratner, Saving Failed States, FOREIGN POL'Y,
Dec. 22, 1992, at 3; Paul Johnson, Colonialism's Back - and Not a Moment Too Soon, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 18, 1993, at 22.
SeeJohnson, supra note 146, at 22; William Pfaff, A New Colonialism? Europe Must Go
Back Into Action, FOREIGN AFF.,Jan.-Feb. 1995, at 2.
18 SeePfaff, supra note 147, at 1.
14 See Gordon, supra note 63, at 925-26; Richardson, supra note 84, at 29-30.
A Race Approach to International Law
examples illustrate, race has been and perhaps may always be an
essential component of international law.
CONCLUSION
Much to the credit of recent scholarly undertakings, theory in in-
ternational law has gained importance. At the heart of the meth-
ods that defend or critique current structures is whether these
methods adequately respond to the needs of those directly affected
by international law. Some of the more challenging methodologi-
cal approaches have taken this a step further by championing a
focus on the importance of cultural and gender issues. Using the
example of United States colonialism as well as the international
effort to eradicate colonialism, this work argues that race has al-
ways been a real but unspoken factor in international policy. A
Race Approach to International Law or RAIL a framework ac-
knowledges the reality that race has been a focal point of the in-
ternational discourse. This framework calls for scholars to con-
sider centering an examination of an international issue from the
perspective of the issue's implications on race as well as the impli-
cation of race constructions on an international issue. This request
for the inclusion of a race conscious dialogue is in the spirit of ex-
tending recent methodological developments which seek to
broaden the scope and depth of international issues, and in turn
prevent the historical relegation of racial issues in the international
discourse to unspoken or unemphasized components of a larger
construct.
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